

## European Economics Analyst

# Euro Area—Debt Sustainability and Higher Rates (Stott)

- The increase in long-term interest rates has brought the longer-term outlook for debt sustainability back into focus. The limited changes in long-term real growth and inflation expectations imply that the differential between the effective interest rate on debt and nominal growth ( $i-g$ ) is set to return close to its late-1990s average. The ratio of primary (ex interest) balances would therefore have to improve by 1pp to 3pp of GDP to prevent an increase in the debt ratio—the simplest criterion for debt sustainability.
- Our assessment suggests that the required consolidation paths look largely attainable. First, primary balances will need to reach terminal levels which remain well within the historical range for most countries, albeit at the upper end for Italy. Second, the pace at which primary balances will have to improve falls short of our estimates of so-called “speed limits” to consolidation. Lastly, we see reasons to look for consolidation efforts to be relatively less detrimental to growth than in the past.
- Our central case is, however, exposed to risks, and the past few years have shown that the sources of shocks hitting the economy can be very relevant to debt dynamics. The energy crisis, for instance, has been a significant drag on growth and triggered a forceful policy response, but is likely to leave the debt ratio broadly unchanged because of the diluting effects from inflation. Our analysis suggests that debt trajectories in the Euro area are most exposed to an unwarranted tightening in interest rates, where interest rates rise despite weaker growth and inflation.
- While central banks have historically helped achieve debt sustainability by, for instance, maintaining deeply negative real rates in the post-war era, the return of inflation in the Euro area has exposed two different trade-offs. A forceful response of policy rates to inflation anchors inflation expectations and helps contain the inflation premia embedded in government bonds, all else equal. And while the use of the central bank’s balance sheet is never a “free lunch,” the perceived credibility of the ECB’s commitment to guard against non-fundamental sovereign stress has so far proven to be relatively cheap and effective.

### Sven Jari Stehn

+44(20)7774-8061 | jari.stehn@gs.com  
Goldman Sachs International

### Filippo Taddei

+44(20)7774-5458 |  
filippo.taddei@gs.com  
Goldman Sachs International

### Christian Schnittker

+44(20)7774-2269 |  
christian.schnittker@gs.com  
Goldman Sachs International

### James Moberly

+44(20)7774-9444 |  
james.r.moberly@gs.com  
Goldman Sachs International

### Alexandre Stott

+33(1)4212-1108 |  
alexandre.stott@gs.com  
Goldman Sachs Bank Europe SE - Paris Branch

### Ibrahim Quadri

+44(20)7774-5864 |  
ibrahim.quadri@gs.com  
Goldman Sachs International


### Katya Vashkinskaya

+44(20)7774-4833 |  
katya.vashkinskaya@gs.com  
Goldman Sachs International

## Euro Area—Debt Sustainability and Higher Rates

Public debt ratios in the Euro area stand at elevated levels by post-war standards (Exhibit 1, left). The increase in long-term interest rates—and the upward revision to longer-term forwards, in particular—has refocused attention on the longer-term outlook for debt sustainability (Exhibit 1, right).

**Exhibit 1: Setting the Scene**



We splice back OECD data with the Jorda et al. (2017) macro-history database.

Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Haver Analytics, Jordà et al. (2017)

In this week's *Analyst*, we therefore assess the challenges posed by higher rates to debt sustainability.


### Sizing The Challenge

We start with the simple definition for debt sustainability that the debt-to-GDP ratio is on a non-increasing trajectory. The textbook approach takes the macroeconomic backdrop—of real growth, inflation and interest rates—as given and uses the debt accumulation equation to back out the lowest primary balance necessary to keep debt from increasing. This gives a benchmark consolidation path which we can compare against hurdles, such as the long-term level for the primary balance, the pace at which it must improve, or the composition of the consolidation effort.

We first review the evolution of the long-term macroeconomic outlook. It is, in that respect, remarkable how little long-term real growth and inflation expectations have changed over the last few years (Exhibit 2, left). Regarding real growth, we have long argued that the Covid and energy crises would be more likely to leave scars to the long-term level of output than on its growth rate. Long-term inflation expectations have so far stayed well anchored and have risen only modestly, back to 2%. Market pricing, on the other hand, implies that the increase in long-term interest rates could be sustained in the future. Once debt is rolled over at this higher cost, we estimate that the differential between the effective interest rate on debt and nominal growth ( $i-g$ ) will have returned to its 1990 – 2008 average (Exhibit 2, right). That is, close to zero for Germany,

France and Spain, and modestly positive for Italy.

## Exhibit 2: Interest Rate – Growth Differential Deterioration




On the left, we show Consensus Economics expectations for Euro area real GDP growth and headline inflation 6 to 10 years ahead. On the right, we splice back OECD data with the Jorda et al. (2017) macro-history database. The dashed lines use IMF forecasts for nominal growth. We compute the effective interest rate by conditioning on market pricing for the tenor of the average maturity and assume that debt is rolled over at a rate of 1/(average maturity) per year.

Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Consensus Economics, IMF, Jordà et al. (2017), Haver Analytics

We can then back-out the lowest level of primary balances which keeps the debt ratio from increasing, given by  $(i-g)/(1+g) * \text{debt ratio}$ . We first note that primary balance ratios will have to improve by 1pp to 3pp of GDP to offset the deterioration in the interest rate – growth differential (Exhibit 3, left). That said, Germany, France, and Spain should continue to be able to run primary deficits close to their historical median. While the primary surpluses required in Italy are not unusual by historical standards, they would need to approach the country's 20th post-war percentile (Exhibit 3, right). We therefore cautiously conclude that the level of primary balance required by the higher interest rates looks attainable.

## Exhibit 3: Primary Balances Back Within their Historical Range




On the left, debt-stabilising primary balances are computed using IMF forecasts for nominal growth and market pricing for rates. On the right, we show the kernel-smoothed historical distribution of primary balances obtained from splicing OECD data back with the Jorda et al. (2017) macro-history database.

Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Haver Analytics, Jordà et al. (2017), IMF

The pace at which governments will need to run their fiscal consolidation reflects the speed at which the effective cost of debt will incorporate higher spot interest rates, for a given nominal growth outlook. The lengthening of government debt maturities during the past decade—by 1.7 years on average across the Euro area—will provide governments with a helpful buffer. We have long argued that maintaining a sustainable pace is key to achieving a successful consolidation, as governments often face so-called “speed limits.” Intuitively, faster adjustments typically become counterproductive and lead to a smaller improvement in primary balances, as growth deteriorates and governments are obliged to cut taxes. We find evidence of such speed limits in France, Italy, and Spain, but not in Germany (Exhibit 4, left).<sup>1</sup> While governments currently plan to run primary balances above their debt-stabilising thresholds in 2024, our calculations suggest that speed limits could bind in Italy and Spain in 2025 if governments do not maintain a robust pace of consolidation into next year (Exhibit 4, right).

**Exhibit 4: Consolidation Pace Unlikely to Bind**



On the left, a leftward move implies a greater consolidation effort. On the right, red dashes indicate the x-coordinate of the parabolas' maximum on the left, given by  $(-b/2*a)$  for the specification  $y = a*x^2 + b*x + c$ , with y the change in the primary balance and x the change in government expenditure.

Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research


Turning to the composition of adjustment efforts, we have shown that expenditure-based (as opposed to revenue-based) consolidations tend to weigh less on growth and have a higher chance of succeeding in improving the fiscal position sustainably. It is therefore encouraging from this perspective that governments have so far shown little appetite to raise taxes in their near-term fiscal strategies. However, a lesson from the Euro area debt crisis is that reducing expenditure by cutting public investment rather than scaling back government spending (consumption and transfers) could weigh on an economy's growth potential and eventually prove self-defeating in decreasing the debt ratio (Exhibit 5, left).

We see two reasons to be more constructive on the spending/investment mix during the upcoming effort to contain public expenditure. First, the European fiscal framework

<sup>1</sup> We regress the change in primary balances on the change in expenditure and the squared change in expenditure. The coefficient on the squared change in expenditure is negative and statistically significant for France, Italy, and Spain. This coefficient in Germany is not statistically different from zero.

now explicitly calls for countries to protect public investment and will be helping to fund investment via the Recovery Fund until at least 2026. Second, the labour market reforms undertaken by countries over the last decade have likely lowered natural unemployment rates and created sizeable fiscal room (Exhibit 5, right). A simple visual examination would suggest that government consumption and transfers across the EMU4 are 3pp of GDP higher than historically implied by the unemployment rate. Shrinking this gap would make a large step towards the 1-3pp range we outlined above while protecting investment.

**Exhibit 5: Scope for More Growth-Friendly Consolidation Efforts**



On the right, we augment the EA20 unemployment rate with a weighted-average of Short-Term Work schemes (STWs) take-up in Germany, France, and Italy.

Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Haver Analytics

Overall, the challenge that higher interest rates pose to preventing the debt ratio from increasing looks manageable, albeit more challenging in Italy. The two key assumptions underpinning this assessment are that (i) the composition and pace of fiscal consolidations do not lead to a significant deterioration in nominal growth and (ii) debt is rolled over at higher costs in an orderly manner.

### Sources of Risk


Our central case is, however, exposed to risks, and the past few years have shown that the sources of shocks hitting the economy can be very relevant to debt dynamics. The energy crisis, for instance, has been a significant drag on growth and triggered forceful fiscal and monetary responses. But these upward pressures on debt dynamics were offset by the surge in inflation and left debt ratios broadly unchanged. The Euro area sovereign crisis, in contrast, presented a much more challenging macro environment of lower growth, lower inflation and higher interest rates, which left debt ratios higher on net despite sharp fiscal consolidation.

We can study the relevance of different sources of risk to the fiscal outlook with a so-called "vector auto-regression." We can use the cross-correlation of statistical residuals to the growth, inflation, and interest rates processes to infer uncorrelated shocks (Exhibit 6). We classify as demand-induced those shocks that push output above potential, boost inflation, and lead long-term rates to increase. Supply shocks push

activity and inflation in the opposite direction and are agnostic with respect to the response of long-term rates. Policy shocks see output and inflation fall against rising long-term rates.

We then trace out the historical response of primary balances to each of these shocks across eight Euro area economies with so-called “local projections.” We show our estimates at the bottom-right of Exhibit 6. The primary balance tends to deteriorate following a demand shock but improves after a supply shock. Policy shocks are the most challenging from a fiscal perspective and eventually lead the primary balance to consolidate.

**Exhibit 6: Fiscal Environment and Macro Shocks**




All shocks are rescaled to generate a 1pp increase in the output gap at peak. The top- and bottom-left charts show the average impulse response from a sign-restricted VAR across the EMU4. The impulse response of the primary balance shown in the bottom right is obtained from local projections run on a wider panel of EA8 countries with time and country fixed effects. The sample for both is 1990Q1:2019Q4.

Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

We compute the effects of the three types of shock on the area-wide average debt ratio via the debt accumulation equation (Exhibit 7, left). The debt ratio tends to increase sharply following a negative demand shock, as observed during the early years of the GFC and the Covid pandemic. Monetary policy responds rapidly with lower rates but the benefits to borrowing costs only accrue slowly as debt is gradually rolled over, and

eventually falls short of offsetting the fall in nominal output (Exhibit 7, right). Supply shocks tend to improve debt dynamics because monetary and fiscal policy responses have historically been muted. Policy shocks are, as expected, the most detrimental to the debt ratio.

#### Exhibit 7: Policy Shocks Most Challenging From a Fiscal Perspective



On the right, we decompose the contribution of each variable to the change in the debt ratio following the method of Hall and Sargent (2020).


Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

We see two key takeaways from our analysis. First, our baseline for debt ratios to fall slightly in coming years is consistent with the response historically observed in the years following demand and supply shocks, such as the Covid pandemic and the energy crisis. Second, debt trajectories in Europe are most exposed to an unwarranted tightening in interest rates, where interest rates rise despite weaker growth and inflation.

### The Central Bank's Role

Our assessment so far points to two episodes during which central banks played a key role in affecting debt sustainability in Europe. Real policy rates remained deeply negative following WW2 and helped disinflate public debt ratios. More recently, the ECB made use of its balance sheet to narrow sovereign spreads to circumvent the lower bound for rates. But these two episodes also revealed the trade-offs a central bank faces with respect to debt sustainability.


Loose monetary policy during the post-war era came at the cost of de-anchored inflation expectations (Exhibit 8, left). The loss of investor confidence in the nominal value of public debt eventually required a forceful monetary response which forced the government onto a consolidation track. In other words, the central bank had to become systematically more reactive to inflation surprises. Shown formally, the coefficient on inflation in a Taylor Rule for Euro area policy rates increased after the 1970s and has settled at a higher level since the Euro area's inception (Exhibit 8, right). More recently, the indirect benefit of the ECB hiking rapidly in the face of surging inflation has been the continued anchoring of long-term inflation expectations, which would, all else equal, have helped contain the increase in long-term rates.

**Exhibit 8: Policy Rates and Debt Sustainability**

On the left, the full dark blue line shows Consensus Economics expectation for inflation 6 to 10 years ahead. The dashed dark blue line shows the long-term forecast for inflation obtained from a time-varying parameters VAR of the Euro area policy rate, headline consumer price inflation, and real GDP growth. On the right, the dashed dark blue line shows the time-varying coefficient of the response of the policy rate to inflation from the same VAR. A more positive coefficient indicates a more systematic response of monetary policy to inflation.

Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Consensus Economics, Haver Analytics

The increasing use of the central bank's balance sheet also has fiscal implications. The purchase of government bonds has exposed central banks to negative income streams and portfolio losses. In the UK, for instance, HMT must now recapitalise the BoE's Asset Purchase Facility and, and the BoE expects the program to have made a cumulative net loss when fully wound down (Exhibit 9, left). This issue is much less acute for the Eurosystem given the lower maturity of the bonds purchased, the buffer from higher coupon payments, and the less direct linkages between monetary and fiscal authorities. Rather, the main implication of ECB's balance sheet for debt sustainability this cycle has come from the announcement of the Transmission Protection Instrument (Exhibit 9, right). Committing to protect sovereigns from self-fulfilling (non-fundamental) debt spirals has so far proven to be a relatively "cheap lunch," as the central bank has not yet had to back its commitment to preserving policy transmission through actual purchases.

**Exhibit 9: Balance Sheet Policy a “Cheap Lunch” Thus Far**

The left shows a visual approximation of scenario 1B in the BoE's 2023Q3 APF report. For details, see <https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/asset-purchase-facility/2023/2023-q3>

Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, Bank of England, Haver Analytics

Looking forward, debt sustainability in the Euro area will primarily hinge on the ability of governments to offset the deterioration in the macroeconomic environment with higher primary balances. Monetary policy can also support this effort by striking a balance between controlling inflation and avoiding a costly policy error, and by maintaining its commitment to rule out non-fundamental debt spirals.

**Alexandre Stott**

# Disclosure Appendix

## Reg AC

We, Sven Jari Stehn, Filippo Taddei, Christian Schnittker, James Moberly, Alexandre Stott, Ibrahim Quadri and Katya Vashkinskaya, hereby certify that all of the views expressed in this report accurately reflect our personal views, which have not been influenced by considerations of the firm's business or client relationships.

Unless otherwise stated, the individuals listed on the cover page of this report are analysts in Goldman Sachs' Global Investment Research division.

## Disclosures

### Regulatory disclosures

#### Disclosures required by United States laws and regulations

See company-specific regulatory disclosures above for any of the following disclosures required as to companies referred to in this report: manager or co-manager in a pending transaction; 1% or other ownership; compensation for certain services; types of client relationships; managed/co-managed public offerings in prior periods; directorships; for equity securities, market making and/or specialist role. Goldman Sachs trades or may trade as a principal in debt securities (or in related derivatives) of issuers discussed in this report.

The following are additional required disclosures: **Ownership and material conflicts of interest:** Goldman Sachs policy prohibits its analysts, professionals reporting to analysts and members of their households from owning securities of any company in the analyst's area of coverage.

**Analyst compensation:** Analysts are paid in part based on the profitability of Goldman Sachs, which includes investment banking revenues. **Analyst as officer or director:** Goldman Sachs policy generally prohibits its analysts, persons reporting to analysts or members of their households from serving as an officer, director or advisor of any company in the analyst's area of coverage. **Non-U.S. Analysts:** Non-U.S. analysts may not be associated persons of Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC and therefore may not be subject to FINRA Rule 2241 or FINRA Rule 2242 restrictions on communications with subject company, public appearances and trading securities held by the analysts.

#### Additional disclosures required under the laws and regulations of jurisdictions other than the United States

The following disclosures are those required by the jurisdiction indicated, except to the extent already made above pursuant to United States laws and regulations. **Australia:** Goldman Sachs Australia Pty Ltd and its affiliates are not authorised deposit-taking institutions (as that term is defined in the Banking Act 1959 (Cth)) in Australia and do not provide banking services, nor carry on a banking business, in Australia. This research, and any access to it, is intended only for "wholesale clients" within the meaning of the Australian Corporations Act, unless otherwise agreed by Goldman Sachs. In producing research reports, members of Global Investment Research of Goldman Sachs Australia may attend site visits and other meetings hosted by the companies and other entities which are the subject of its research reports. In some instances the costs of such site visits or meetings may be met in part or in whole by the issuers concerned if Goldman Sachs Australia considers it is appropriate and reasonable in the specific circumstances relating to the site visit or meeting. To the extent that the contents of this document contains any financial product advice, it is general advice only and has been prepared by Goldman Sachs without taking into account a client's objectives, financial situation or needs. A client should, before acting on any such advice, consider the appropriateness of the advice having regard to the client's own objectives, financial situation and needs. A copy of certain Goldman Sachs Australia and New Zealand disclosure of interests and a copy of Goldman Sachs' Australian Sell-Side Research Independence Policy Statement are available at: <https://www.goldmansachs.com/disclosures/australia-new-zealand/index.html>. **Brazil:** Disclosure information in relation to CVM Resolution n. 20 is available at <https://www.gs.com/worldwide/brazil/area/gir/index.html>. Where applicable, the Brazil-registered analyst primarily responsible for the content of this research report, as defined in Article 20 of CVM Resolution n. 20, is the first author named at the beginning of this report, unless indicated otherwise at the end of the text. **Canada:** This information is being provided to you for information purposes only and is not, and under no circumstances should be construed as, an advertisement, offering or solicitation by Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC for purchasers of securities in Canada to trade in any Canadian security. Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC is not registered as a dealer in any jurisdiction in Canada under applicable Canadian securities laws and generally is not permitted to trade in Canadian securities and may be prohibited from selling certain securities and products in certain jurisdictions in Canada. If you wish to trade in any Canadian securities or other products in Canada please contact Goldman Sachs Canada Inc., an affiliate of The Goldman Sachs Group Inc., or another registered Canadian dealer. **Hong Kong:** Further information on the securities of covered companies referred to in this research may be obtained on request from Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C. **India:** Further information on the subject company or companies referred to in this research may be obtained from Goldman Sachs (India) Securities Private Limited, Research Analyst - SEBI Registration Number INH000001493, 951-A, Rational House, Appasaheb Marathe Marg, Prabhadevi, Mumbai 400 025, India, Corporate Identity Number U71410MH2006FTC160634, Phone +91 22 6616 9000, Fax +91 22 6616 9001. Goldman Sachs may beneficially own 1% or more of the securities (as such term is defined in clause 2 (h) the Indian Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956) of the subject company or companies referred to in this research report. Investment in securities market are subject to market risks. Read all the related documents carefully before investing. Registration granted by SEBI and certification from NISM in no way guarantee performance of the intermediary or provide any assurance of returns to investors. Goldman Sachs (India) Securities Private Limited Investor Grievance E-mail: [india-client-support@gs.com](mailto:india-client-support@gs.com). Compliance Officer: Anil Rajput | Tel: + 91 22 6616 9000 | Email: [anil.m.rajput@gs.com](mailto:anil.m.rajput@gs.com). **Japan:** See below. **Korea:** This research, and any access to it, is intended only for "professional investors" within the meaning of the Financial Services and Capital Markets Act, unless otherwise agreed by Goldman Sachs. Further information on the subject company or companies referred to in this research may be obtained from Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C., Seoul Branch. **New Zealand:** Goldman Sachs New Zealand Limited and its affiliates are neither "registered banks" nor "deposit takers" (as defined in the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989) in New Zealand. This research, and any access to it, is intended for "wholesale clients" (as defined in the Financial Advisers Act 2008) unless otherwise agreed by Goldman Sachs. A copy of certain Goldman Sachs Australia and New Zealand disclosure of interests is available at: <https://www.goldmansachs.com/disclosures/australia-new-zealand/index.html>. **Russia:** Research reports distributed in the Russian Federation are not advertising as defined in the Russian legislation, but are information and analysis not having product promotion as their main purpose and do not provide appraisal within the meaning of the Russian legislation on appraisal activity. Research reports do not constitute a personalized investment recommendation as defined in Russian laws and regulations, are not addressed to a specific client, and are prepared without analyzing the financial circumstances, investment profiles or risk profiles of clients. Goldman Sachs assumes no responsibility for any investment decisions that may be taken by a client or any other person based on this research report. **Singapore:** Goldman Sachs (Singapore) Pte. (Company Number: 198602165W), which is regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore, accepts legal responsibility for this research, and should be contacted with respect to any matters arising from, or in connection with, this research. **Taiwan:** This material is for reference only and must not be reprinted without permission. Investors should carefully consider their own investment risk. Investment results are the responsibility of the individual investor. **United Kingdom:** Persons who would be categorized as retail clients in the United Kingdom, as such term is defined in the rules of the Financial Conduct Authority, should read this research in conjunction with prior Goldman Sachs research on the covered companies referred to herein and should refer to the risk warnings that have been sent to them by Goldman Sachs International. A copy of these risks warnings, and a glossary of certain financial terms used in this report, are available from Goldman Sachs International on request.

**European Union and United Kingdom:** Disclosure information in relation to Article 6 (2) of the European Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)

(2016/958) supplementing Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (including as that Delegated Regulation is implemented into United Kingdom domestic law and regulation following the United Kingdom's departure from the European Union and the European Economic Area) with regard to regulatory technical standards for the technical arrangements for objective presentation of investment recommendations or other information recommending or suggesting an investment strategy and for disclosure of particular interests or indications of conflicts of interest is available at <https://www.gs.com/disclosures/europeanpolicy.html> which states the European Policy for Managing Conflicts of Interest in Connection with Investment Research.

**Japan:** Goldman Sachs Japan Co., Ltd. is a Financial Instrument Dealer registered with the Kanto Financial Bureau under registration number Kinsho 69, and a member of Japan Securities Dealers Association, Financial Futures Association of Japan Type II Financial Instruments Firms Association, The Investment Trusts Association, Japan, and Japan Investment Advisers Association. Sales and purchase of equities are subject to commission pre-determined with clients plus consumption tax. See company-specific disclosures as to any applicable disclosures required by Japanese stock exchanges, the Japanese Securities Dealers Association or the Japanese Securities Finance Company.

## Global product; distributing entities

Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research produces and distributes research products for clients of Goldman Sachs on a global basis. Analysts based in Goldman Sachs offices around the world produce research on industries and companies, and research on macroeconomics, currencies, commodities and portfolio strategy. This research is disseminated in Australia by Goldman Sachs Australia Pty Ltd (ABN 21 006 797 897); in Brazil by Goldman Sachs do Brasil Corretora de Títulos e Valores Mobiliários S.A.; Public Communication Channel Goldman Sachs Brasil: 0800 727 5764 and / or [contatogoldmanbrasil@gs.com](mailto:contatogoldmanbrasil@gs.com). Available Weekdays (except holidays), from 9am to 6pm. Canal de Comunicação com o Público Goldman Sachs Brasil: 0800 727 5764 e/ou [contatogoldmanbrasil@gs.com](mailto:contatogoldmanbrasil@gs.com). Horário de funcionamento: segunda-feira à sexta-feira (exceto feriados), das 9h às 18h; in Canada by Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC; in Hong Kong by Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C.; in India by Goldman Sachs (India) Securities Private Ltd.; in Japan by Goldman Sachs Japan Co., Ltd.; in the Republic of Korea by Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C., Seoul Branch; in New Zealand by Goldman Sachs New Zealand Limited; in Russia by OOO Goldman Sachs; in Singapore by Goldman Sachs (Singapore) Pte. (Company Number: 198602165W); and in the United States of America by Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC. Goldman Sachs International has approved this research in connection with its distribution in the United Kingdom.

Goldman Sachs International ("GSI"), authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority ("PRA") and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority ("FCA") and the PRA, has approved this research in connection with its distribution in the United Kingdom.

**European Economic Area:** GSI, authorised by the PRA and regulated by the FCA and the PRA, disseminates research in the following jurisdictions within the European Economic Area: the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Italy, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Finland and the Republic of Ireland; GSI - Succursale de Paris (Paris branch) which is authorised by the French Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution ("ACPR") and regulated by the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution and the Autorité des marchés financiers ("AMF") disseminates research in France; GSI - Sucursal en España (Madrid branch) authorized in Spain by the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores disseminates research in the Kingdom of Spain; GSI - Sweden Bankfilial (Stockholm branch) is authorized by the SFSA as a "third country branch" in accordance with Chapter 4, Section 4 of the Swedish Securities and Market Act (Sv. lag (2007:528) om värdepappersmarknaden) disseminates research in the Kingdom of Sweden; Goldman Sachs Bank Europe SE ("GSBE") is a credit institution incorporated in Germany and, within the Single Supervisory Mechanism, subject to direct prudential supervision by the European Central Bank and in other respects supervised by German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin) and Deutsche Bundesbank and disseminates research in the Federal Republic of Germany and those jurisdictions within the European Economic Area where GSI is not authorised to disseminate research and additionally, GSBE, Copenhagen Branch filial af GSBE, Tyskland, supervised by the Danish Financial Authority disseminates research in the Kingdom of Denmark; GSBE - Sucursal en España (Madrid branch) subject (to a limited extent) to local supervision by the Bank of Spain disseminates research in the Kingdom of Spain; GSBE - Succursale Italia (Milan branch) to the relevant applicable extent, subject to local supervision by the Bank of Italy (Banca d'Italia) and the Italian Companies and Exchange Commission (Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa "Consob") disseminates research in Italy; GSBE - Succursale de Paris (Paris branch), supervised by the AMF and by the ACPR disseminates research in France; and GSBE - Sweden Bankfilial (Stockholm branch), to a limited extent, subject to local supervision by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (Finansinspektionen) disseminates research in the Kingdom of Sweden.

## General disclosures

This research is for our clients only. Other than disclosures relating to Goldman Sachs, this research is based on current public information that we consider reliable, but we do not represent it is accurate or complete, and it should not be relied on as such. The information, opinions, estimates and forecasts contained herein are as of the date hereof and are subject to change without prior notification. We seek to update our research as appropriate, but various regulations may prevent us from doing so. Other than certain industry reports published on a periodic basis, the large majority of reports are published at irregular intervals as appropriate in the analyst's judgment.

Goldman Sachs conducts a global full-service, integrated investment banking, investment management, and brokerage business. We have investment banking and other business relationships with a substantial percentage of the companies covered by Global Investment Research. Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, the United States broker dealer, is a member of SIPC (<https://www.sipc.org>).

Our salespeople, traders, and other professionals may provide oral or written market commentary or trading strategies to our clients and principal trading desks that reflect opinions that are contrary to the opinions expressed in this research. Our asset management area, principal trading desks and investing businesses may make investment decisions that are inconsistent with the recommendations or views expressed in this research.

We and our affiliates, officers, directors, and employees will from time to time have long or short positions in, act as principal in, and buy or sell, the securities or derivatives, if any, referred to in this research, unless otherwise prohibited by regulation or Goldman Sachs policy.

The views attributed to third party presenters at Goldman Sachs arranged conferences, including individuals from other parts of Goldman Sachs, do not necessarily reflect those of Global Investment Research and are not an official view of Goldman Sachs.

Any third party referenced herein, including any salespeople, traders and other professionals or members of their household, may have positions in the products mentioned that are inconsistent with the views expressed by analysts named in this report.

This research is focused on investment themes across markets, industries and sectors. It does not attempt to distinguish between the prospects or performance of, or provide analysis of, individual companies within an industry or sector we describe.

Any trading recommendation in this research relating to an equity or credit security or securities within an industry or sector is reflective of the investment theme being discussed and is not a recommendation of any such security in isolation.

This research is not an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any security in any jurisdiction where such an offer or solicitation would be illegal. It does not constitute a personal recommendation or take into account the particular investment objectives, financial situations, or needs of individual clients. Clients should consider whether any advice or recommendation in this research is suitable for their particular circumstances and, if appropriate, seek professional advice, including tax advice. The price and value of investments referred to in this research and the income from them may fluctuate. Past performance is not a guide to future performance, future returns are not guaranteed, and a loss of original capital may occur.

Fluctuations in exchange rates could have adverse effects on the value or price of, or income derived from, certain investments.

Certain transactions, including those involving futures, options, and other derivatives, give rise to substantial risk and are not suitable for all investors. Investors should review current options and futures disclosure documents which are available from Goldman Sachs sales representatives or at <https://www.theocc.com/about/publications/character-risks.jsp> and

[https://www.fiadocumentation.org/fia/regulatory-disclosures\\_1/fia-uniform-futures-and-options-on-futures-risk-disclosures-booklet-pdf-version-2018](https://www.fiadocumentation.org/fia/regulatory-disclosures_1/fia-uniform-futures-and-options-on-futures-risk-disclosures-booklet-pdf-version-2018).

Transaction costs may be significant in option strategies calling for multiple purchase and sales of options such as spreads. Supporting documentation will be supplied upon request.

**Differing Levels of Service provided by Global Investment Research:** The level and types of services provided to you by Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research may vary as compared to that provided to internal and other external clients of GS, depending on various factors including your individual preferences as to the frequency and manner of receiving communication, your risk profile and investment focus and perspective (e.g., marketwide, sector specific, long term, short term), the size and scope of your overall client relationship with GS, and legal and regulatory constraints. As an example, certain clients may request to receive notifications when research on specific securities is published, and certain clients may request that specific data underlying analysts' fundamental analysis available on our internal client websites be delivered to them electronically through data feeds or otherwise. No change to an analyst's fundamental research views (e.g., ratings, price targets, or material changes to earnings estimates for equity securities), will be communicated to any client prior to inclusion of such information in a research report broadly disseminated through electronic publication to our internal client websites or through other means, as necessary, to all clients who are entitled to receive such reports.

All research reports are disseminated and available to all clients simultaneously through electronic publication to our internal client websites. Not all research content is redistributed to our clients or available to third-party aggregators, nor is Goldman Sachs responsible for the redistribution of our research by third party aggregators. For research, models or other data related to one or more securities, markets or asset classes (including related services) that may be available to you, please contact your GS representative or go to <https://research.gs.com>.

Disclosure information is also available at <https://www.gs.com/research/hedge.html> or from Research Compliance, 200 West Street, New York, NY 10282.

© 2023 Goldman Sachs.

**No part of this material may be (i) copied, photocopied or duplicated in any form by any means or (ii) redistributed without the prior written consent of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.**