Goldman Sachs Research
US Economics Analyst
Good News on the Economy, Bad News on Fiscal Stimulus
8 September 2020 | 3:17AM EDT | Research | Economics| By Jan Hatzius and others
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  • Pre-election fiscal stimulus looks like a much closer call than it did a couple of months ago amid mounting signs of trouble. Recent deadlines did not force an agreement and Congress will be in session only briefly before the election. The strong August jobs report also looks likely to reduce political pressure to compromise.

  • However, we still think that Congress is slightly more likely than not to enact a stimulus package by the end of the September. Enhanced unemployment benefits will soon run dry, which could force action, and September is likely to be the last opportunity to pass fiscal measures until well after the election and potentially early 2021. Incumbents of both parties might be wary of inaction for such a long period.

  • If Congress enacts a stimulus package in September, we believe the package is likely to be somewhat smaller than the $1.5 to $2.0 trillion package we believed was likely a month ago. There appears to be lukewarm support for another round of payments to individuals and concerns regarding the overall size of the package could crowd out an additional round of checks. We are revising our assumptions to assume a $1 trillion package that includes a $400/week payment extra unemployment benefit through year-end, additional small business support, and modest state fiscal aid, but no further payments to individuals.

  • Despite the bad news on the fiscal policy front, we have upgraded our disposable personal income (DPI) forecasts following recent spending and employment data that have come in much better than we expected. We now expect nominal DPI growth of 6.3% in 2020 on a full-year basis (vs. 4.0% previously) and -1.9% in 2021 (vs. -2.3% previously) as fiscal support declines.

  • On the back of continued strong signals from alternative consumption data, we have also upgraded our Q3 consumption tracking estimate further (+42% annualized vs. +35% previously, and well above consensus of +24%) and our Q4 estimate (+5% vs. +4% previously). Some of this near-term upgrade reflects a pulling forward of the consumer recovery, which combined with the net downgrade to our fiscal projections implies modestly weaker spending growth in 2021.

  • We are also revising our GDP forecast on the back of these changes. The largest change is in Q3, where we now expect quarterly annualized GDP growth of +35% (vs. +30% previously and consensus of +21%). We have marked down our 2021 forecasts modestly, again reflecting both the pulling-forward of the recovery and the modest fiscal downgrade.

  • We now expect the official unemployment rate to reach 7.0% at end-2020 (vs. 9.0% previously), 5.6% at end-2021, 5% at end-2022, and 4.5% at end-2023. Our +6% forecast for 2021 GDP growth on its own would call for a larger decline in the unemployment rate next year, but we think participation will rebound strongly as a vaccine eliminates most of the hurdles to rejoining the labor force.

Good News on the Economy, Bad News on Fiscal Stimulus

Pre-election fiscal stimulus looks like a much closer call than it did a couple of months ago. We still think that Congress is slightly more likely than not to enact a stimulus package by the end of the September, but there are mounting signs of trouble:
  • The passage of recent deadlines did not come close to forcing an agreement. We expected that the expiration of stepped-up unemployment insurance payments at the end of July would put pressure on lawmakers to reach a deal. However, neither the passing of that deadline nor the start of the congressional recess that followed a week later was enough to bring about a compromise.

  • The August jobs report reduces political pressure for further stimulus. Some lawmakers opposed extension of the extra unemployment benefit due to its potential to disincentivize a return to work and might see the sharp drop in the unemployment rate as support for their view. While the details of the report do not bear this out—the employment gains came primarily from fewer layoffs rather than more hiring—it does suggest that the economic situation continued to improve in August with relatively little fiscal support.

  • The two sides appear to be moving farther apart. While Republicans and Democrats had narrowed the gap between their positions to less than $1 trillion by early August, it appears to have widened a bit since then. Senate Republicans are readying a package reportedly worth around $500bn, while Democrats are seeking $2.2 trillion.

  • Neither party appears to face political pressure to agree. A CNBC poll in early August found that an equal share of likely swing-state voters blamed Republicans as blamed Democrats for a failure to pass a fiscal relief package prior to the expiration of the increased unemployment benefit payment in late July.

  • There isn’t much time left to reach a deal. The House does not return until September 14 and is scheduled to be in session only ten full work days before adjourning October 2 ahead of the election. While the calendar can be extended if necessary, the probability of a deal will dwindle as the election approaches.

That said, we believe there is a slightly better chance that Congress enacts at least some fiscal measures before leaving at the end of September.
  • At least publicly, none of the main parties to the negotiation opposes substantial stimulus. Voters of both parties appear to support additional fiscal measures, though Democrats support them more strongly than Republicans. Likewise, most Democratic lawmakers have publicly supported an even larger package than most Republicans, despite the greater political incentive that Republicans have as the incumbent party to support the economy ahead of the November presidential election. The White House has announced support for a $1.3 trillion package, as well as the extension of extra unemployment benefits, another round of payments to individuals, and additional support for businesses. Most Republican lawmakers are also likely to support a smaller package (somewhere between $500bn and $1 trillion) that includes those components expected to come up for a vote in the Senate in the next several days. Congressional Democrats have reduced their proposed top line from $3.5 trillion to $2.2 trillion, though it is unclear what parts of their prior proposal this smaller package would omit.

Exhibit 1: Broad Support for Stimulus, but Deeper Among Democrats

1. Broad Support for Stimulus, but Deeper Among Democrats. Data available on request.
Source: Data compiled by Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
  • There are still some potential forcing events on the calendar. The extra unemployment benefit that the White House partially and temporarily restored through executive order will likely lapse again by late September as funding runs dry after states make lump-sum payments of $300/week retroactive to early August. Once Congress recesses at the end of September or early October, they are unlikely to return until mid-November, so declining to extend those benefits before they leave for the election would essentially eliminate any chance of further extension. Since both parties appear to believe some extension is in their interest, this seems likely to push lawmakers to reach at least a limited deal. That said, uneven implementation by states is likely to mean that there is a not a single deadline in the media that focuses public and media attention.

  • Congress also needs to pass legislation before the end of the federal fiscal year on Sept. 30 to extend spending authority and several expiring programs. However, the pact among congressional leaders and the White House to pass a clean “continuing resolution” to avoid a shutdown means that this could still be a useful legislative device to ease passage of a deal that has been worked out, but the deadline is unlikely to force an agreement that wouldn’t be reached otherwise.

  • While voters do not appear to blame one party more than the other, this might change. With a Republican president running for reelection, Congressional Democrats have little political incentive to support additional stimulus. As noted above, so far voters appear to blame both sides equally for the failure to enact additional relief, but this might change. Democrats might come under more political pressure if, for example, they block a proposal that has near-unanimous Republican support. The dynamic could shift in coming days if Republicans are able to get at least 50 votes in the Senate for their own stimulus measure. Since at least 7 Democratic votes would be needed to overcome a filibuster, Democrats have sufficient votes to block it but doing so would leave Democrats in the situation of opposing less fiscal stimulus in favor of no fiscal stimulus.

  • Four months is a long time to wait. Most observers believe that failure to enact stimulus in September would likely push the debate into early 2021, when the next presidential term begins and the new Congress is seated. The year-end expiration of many CARES Act policies, including broadened unemployment insurance eligibility, could prompt Congress to enact before then, but it nevertheless seems unlikely that lawmakers will be comfortable with inaction over such a long period.

Another round of payments to individuals looks less likely, in our view. We have decided to remove another round of stimulus checks, formally known as Economic Impact Payments (EIP), from our baseline forecast, though there remains a fair chance that Congress might approve another round. While there is not strong opposition to another round from any of the main parties to the negotiations, it is not the top priority of any group, either. In a scenario where congressional Republicans seek to limit the overall size of the package, another round of nearly $300bn in payments to individuals might be deemed unaffordable. Moreover, in light of the 2-3 weeks it might take the Treasury to make the payments, a fiscal package enacted in late September would mean that voters would receive checks just weeks before the election, which Democrats in Congress might want to avoid.
The total size of the package looks more likely to be in the range of $1 trillion. Until recently, we had expected that Congress would pass a package worth $1.5 trillion and believed that the risks were to the upside of this amount. A $1.5 trillion package, or even something slightly larger, is clearly still possible, but we think the risks skew more to the downside at the moment. In part this is because without stimulus checks, it is hard to see how a fiscal package could reach that size without substantial fiscal support to state and local governments. Congressional Republicans and the White House are likely to resist substantial spending in this area that goes beyond the education-related funds that both parties support.
The outlook for fiscal policy in 2021 depends on the election outcome. In particular, we expect that if Democrats win the White House and Congress as prediction markets expect, Congress would pass a fiscal package in Q1 2021 including several components of the House-passed HEROES Act.[1] Specifically, the Biden campaign has endorsed:
  • Aid to state and local governments. The House-passed HEROES Act provided roughly $1 trillion in fiscal support to state and local governments. We expect that a Democratic-controlled Congress would approve an amount closer to half of this.

  • Extension of expanded unemployment insurance. We expect that a Democratic Congress would extend expanded eligibility and extended duration of benefits through 2021, and would phase down extra payments from the $400/week we expect through year-end to $100/week by the end of 2021.

  • Small business support. The Biden campaign has endorsed a “comeback package for Main Street businesses”, which we expect would involve, at a minimum, allowing businesses to take additional loans under the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and some additional funding for that program.

We also assume a Democratic Congress would enact another round of stimulus payments. Democrats have supported such payments to a greater degree than most Republicans. Another round of payments would become even more likely, we believe, if Congress does not pass stimulus legislation in the next few weeks.
Beyond a stimulus package, other Democratic policy measures would probably not impact growth substantially until 2022. Following fiscal stimulus early in 2021, we expect that a Democratic-controlled Congress and White House would enact an infrastructure package and potentially other fiscal measures. Vice President Biden has also proposed increasing corporate and individual taxes, which could weigh on growth. However, these would be used to pay for government spending and fiscal transfers that would push in the opposite direction. Regardless, we expect that such measures would not pass before mid-2021 and that the resulting tax and spending increases would not occur in earnest until 2022.
A divided government scenario would likely result in more limited stimulus in 2021. Congress seems likely to renew the extended duration of unemployment benefits that expires at year-end regardless of the election outcome. Following the last few recessions, extra weeks of unemployment benefits have lasted for a few years after the unemployment rate peaked, and we expect that Congress would provide extra weeks of benefits through 2021 under any election scenario.
A divided Congress seems less likely to approve another round of stimulus payments or extra unemployment benefits. Senate Republicans look likely to omit another round of payments from their upcoming stimulus proposal. Some Republican lawmakers have been skeptical of the extra unemployment benefit payment, though most support extension of a $300/week extra payment for the next few months. By next year, with the election in the past, we expect less Republican support for either policy.
Implications of Our Fiscal Downgrade and Latest Data for Disposable Income and Consumption
We are updating our forecasts of disposable personal income (DPI), consumer spending, and GDP growth to reflect both the latest data and our revised fiscal expectations. In brief, the recent spending and employment data have been much better than we expected, and we have upgraded Q3 accordingly, but the good news is partially offset by the downgrade to our fiscal expectations.
In April, we first highlighted that disposable income was likely to rise despite enormous job losses thanks to more generous than usual income support policies. This is a remarkably different pattern from most recessions and it has been a key pillar of our view that the recovery will be much faster than usual. Since then, DPI has proven even more resilient than we expected and is now up 9.5% year-on-year in nominal terms through July. Although fiscal support from the CARES Act has driven much of the strength, several components of income have also held up much better than we expected. In particular, employee compensation was down only 4.6% from February through July, and the surge in household employment in August suggests it recovered substantially further last month.
Exhibit 2 presents our updated DPI forecast, which reflects both our new fiscal outlook and our latest labor market projections. We now forecast that the level of nominal disposable income peaked in Q2 and will gradually decline in Q3 and Q4. Our revised projections imply DPI growth of 6.3% in 2020 on a full-year basis (vs. 4.0% in our previous forecast) and -1.9% in 2021 (vs. -2.3% previously) as fiscal support declines. Our projections are up on net because the upgrade to our labor income forecast more than outweighs a -0.5% hit from the downgrade to our fiscal expectations over 2020Q3-2021Q4.

Exhibit 2: We Expect Disposable Income Growth of +6.3% in 2020 and -1.9% in 2021

2. We Expect Disposable Income Growth of +6.3% in 2020 and -1.9% in 2021. Data available on request.
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
Exhibit 3 summarizes our baseline expectation for some of the main components of a potential fiscal stimulus package, as well as how those provisions might be treated under the four alternative scenarios discussed earlier.

Exhibit 3: Several Potential Scenarios for Fiscal Stimulus

3. Several Potential Scenarios for Fiscal Stimulus. Data available on request.
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
Exhibit 4 shows how DPI would evolve under the four alternative scenarios outlined above. If no fiscal package is passed this fall, we expect that DPI will fall further, below its pre-pandemic level, in 2020Q4. DPI rises in all scenarios in 2021H1 because the labor market continues to recover and we assume a second round of PPP funding in all scenarios. But it would likely grow more quickly next year if Democrats sweep the election due to a second round of payments to individuals in 2021Q1 and (as in our baseline forecast) more generous UI benefits supporting income throughout the year. Overall, we forecast total income will be highest in the scenario with a fiscal package and Democratic sweep (+6.3% in 2020, -0.3% in 2021) and lowest in the scenario with no fiscal package and divided government (+5.3% in 2020, -1.2% in 2021). These are not huge differences, in part because many post-election policy changes under unified Democratic control would only take effect in 2022.

Exhibit 4: Income Would Fall Below Its Pre-Pandemic Level in Q4 Without a Fiscal Package, but Would Rise Above Our Baseline in 2021 If Democrats Sweep the Election

4. Income Would Fall Below Its Pre-Pandemic Level in Q4 Without a Fiscal Package, but Would Rise Above Our Baseline in 2021 If Democrats Sweep the Election. Data available on request.
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
To estimate the implications for consumer spending, we apply standard marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) to our forecasts for the various components of private income and fiscal transfers. For example, we assume a high MPC for labor income and government transfer payments, but a low MPC for asset income and tax reductions. We also assume a slightly lower MPC from a second round of payments to individuals, which would come when the saving rate is still quite high, than from the first, which came when far more people were without other income.
Exhibit 5 shows our consumption forecasts under each policy scenario. On the back of continued strong signals from alternative consumption data, we have upgraded our Q3 consumption tracking estimate further (+42% annualized vs. +35% previously, and well above consensus of +24%) and our Q4 estimate (+5% vs. +4% previously). Some of this near-term upgrade reflects a pulling forward of the consumer recovery, and that combined with the net downgrade to our fiscal projections implies modestly weaker spending growth in 2021 (+4.2% vs. +5.3% previously on a Q4/Q4 basis). We see risks in both directions. If no fiscal deal is reached, consumption growth would likely turn negative in 2020Q4. But if a Democratic sweep boosts DPI above our baseline, we would expect firmer 2021 consumption growth of +6.9%.
The reason that we expect strong consumption growth next year despite a modest decline in DPI is that the saving rate is still very elevated. We expect it to continue to gradually decline as physical restrictions on spending fade, especially in the first half of next year when we expect a vaccine to become available. Because any sudden withdrawal of fiscal support would likely result in a larger decline in the saving rate, our PCE forecasts differ across scenarios less than our DPI forecasts alone would imply.

Exhibit 5: We Forecast PCE Growth of +42% in 2020Q3, +5% in 2020Q4, and +5.5% in 2020H1

5. We Forecast PCE Growth of +42% in 2020Q3, +5% in 2020Q4, and +5.5% in 2020H1. Data available on request.
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
A Resilient Recovery
We are also revising our GDP forecast on the back of these changes to our PCE forecast. Exhibit 6 shows our new baseline forecast vs. our previous forecast, as well as GDP forecasts for each of the alternative scenarios. The largest change is in Q3, where we now expect quarterly annualized GDP growth of +35% (vs. +30% previously and consensus of +21%). We have marked down our 2021 forecasts modestly, again reflecting both the pulling-forward of the recovery and the modest fiscal downgrade.
A failure to pass a Phase 4 fiscal package that extends UI benefits and provides further business support would result in sharply lower Q4 growth, while a Democratic sweep would likely mean much stronger 2021Q1 growth and about 1pp higher growth in 2021 as a whole, largely because we would expect another round of stimulus payments early in the year.

Exhibit 6: We Have Upgraded Our GDP Growth Forecast to +35% for 2020Q3

6. We Have Upgraded Our GDP Growth Forecast to +35% for 2020Q3. Data available on request.
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
Finally, we have also revised our labor market projections to reflect both the large upside surprise in last Friday’s employment report and the changes to our GDP forecast. Workers on temporary layoff have driven the labor market recovery since April, and with 6 million workers still on temporary layoff, the labor market is positioned for further solid job gains later this year. To forecast employment over the next few months, we estimate labor market transition probabilities between employment, temporary layoff, permanent layoff, and non-participation, using data from both recent months and past recessions. We then apply Okun’s law to forecast employment beyond 2020.
Exhibit 7 shows our revised unemployment rate forecast. We now expect the official unemployment rate to reach 7.0% at end-2020 (vs. 9.0% previously), 5.6% at end-2021, 5% at end-2022, and 4.5% at end-2023. Our +5% forecast for 2021 GDP growth on its own would call for a larger decline in the unemployment rate next year, but we think participation will rebound strongly as a vaccine eliminates most of the hurdles to rejoining the labor force.

Exhibit 7: We Expect the Unemployment Rate to Fall to 7.0% at End-2020 and 5.6% at End-2021

7. We Expect the Unemployment Rate to Fall to 7.0% at End-2020 and 5.6% at End-2021. Data available on request.
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

Joseph Briggs

David Mericle

Alec Phillips

The US Economic and Financial Outlook

Based on strong signals from alternative consumption data, we have upgraded our Q3 growth forecast by 5pp to +35.0% (qoq ar). We believe some of this reflects a pull-forward of output growth relative to our previous expectations, and we lowered our 2021 Q1 and Q2 GDP forecasts by 1.0pp and 1.5pp respectively (to +7.0% and +6.0%).

Data available on request.
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

Economic Releases

Data available on request.
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
  1. 1 ^ As of September 6, trading on PredictIt implied an 82%, 55%, and 57% probability that Democrats will win the House, Senate and White House, respectively.

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